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This paper applies the business cycle accounting method à la Chari, Kehoe and 
McGrattan (2007) to a standard neoclassical small open economy model and assesses 
the recent crises in Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Thailand. The key common 
features of these crises are the sudden output collapses and consumption drops as large 
as the output drops. Quantitative results show that the sudden drops in total factor 
productivity are important in explaining the output drops. Distortions in the foreign 
debt market are important in Korea and Thailand whereas distortions in the domestic 
capital market are important in Hong Kong and Singapore in explaining the large 
consumption drops. 
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In late 1997, several East Asian countries experienced massive economic downturns. The two
key common features of the Asian crisis are the sudden output collapses and consumption
drops as large as the output drops. This paper quantitatively analyzes the recession patterns
in Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Thailand using a small open economy version of the
business cycle accounting method developed by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (CKM (2007)).
Broad literature covering the Asian crisis focuses on the causes and the procedures for
resolution of the ￿nancial and currency crises in which the currencies pegged to US dollars
were attacked by investors1. In contrast, there are few studies with quantitative analyses
on the depression patterns in these countries. Therefore, there are open questions such as,
￿what are the key forces that caused the economic downturn?￿and ￿what are the channels
through which they operated?￿In this paper I address these issues by applying the business
cycle accounting method to the small open economy framework.
The model￿ s foundation is the standard small open economy optimal neoclassical growth
model ￿ la Mendoza (1991) and Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1995) which consists of a ￿rm,
household, government and foreign sector. The ￿rm produces a ￿nal good from capital
and labor using constant returns to scale production technology which ￿ uctuates according
to exogenous changes in total factor productivity (TFP). There is an in￿nitely-lived repre-
sentative household who receives utility from consumption and disutility from labor. The
household owns the physical capital stock and can also borrow from abroad with a non-
1Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2000) and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) claim that implicit
government guarantees to companies and banks led to the crisis by increasing the future government cost.
Chang and Velasco (2000) claims that ￿nancial liberalization in emerging markets attracted large short
term loans, which led to liquidity mismatch as in typical bank-run models. Krugman (1999) argues that
capital out￿ ow forced the foreign debt relying corporate sector to reduce investment while real exchange rate
depreciation increased the value of existing debt, forced ￿rms to further reduce investment and led to a debt
crisis.
1state-contingent 1-period discount bond at a given real interest rate. The government sector
imposes distortionary taxes on the household. I assume that there are also distortions in
the foreign debt market which appear as shocks to the return on international debt. The
distortions in the foreign debt, labor, investment and production markets are computed as
￿wedges￿in equilibrium conditions and are taken as exogenous.
The model includes utility function parameters, production function parameters and
parameters governing the stochastic shock process. I choose values for these parameters based
on data over the 1960-2003 period for each country following the CKM (2007) method. I
take the parameterized model, solve the model for linear decision rules, compute the wedges
and simulate the model by feeding in the time paths of the wedges one by one. I then
visually compare output, consumption, labor and investment from the model to data over
the 1990-2003 period focusing on the sharp recessions in 1998.
There are several closely related quantitative studies that analyze the Asian crisis us-
ing dynamic general equilibrium models. Meza and Quintin (2007) shows that TFP and
factor hoarding are important in explaining recent episodes of economic downturns during
￿nancial crises in emerging economies. Otsu (2006) shows that exogenous TFP alone can
explain the sudden drop and rapid recovery of Korean output while real interest rate shocks
are important in explaining the consumption drop. Cook and Devereux (2006) shows that
the exogenous rise in nominal interest rate premiums in Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia can
account for the output drop in these countries mainly through a contraction in the nontrad-
able sector within a sticky price setting. Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2006) also uses a
sticky price model and shows that the ￿nancial accelerator was important in amplifying the
depressing e⁄ect of real interest rate shocks under the ￿xed exchange rate regime on aggre-
gate demand in Korea. While these studies deduce the impact of certain primary shocks on
2the economy, this paper focuses on ￿where￿the important shocks are rather than ￿what￿
they are.
The key ￿ndings are as follows. Distortions in production (TFP) are important in all
countries in explaining the sudden output collapses. Distortions in the foreign debt market
are important in explaining the consumption drops in Korea and Thailand whereas distor-
tions in the domestic capital market are important in Hong Kong and Singapore. Thus,
advanced models should be aimed to reveal the relationship between TFP and foreign debt
wedges in the Korean and Thailand cases, and TFP and investment wedges in the Hong
Kong and Singapore cases.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the facts of the East
Asian crisis. Section 3 describes the business cycle accounting model. Section 4 presents
quantitative results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Asian Crisis
In this section, I document the similarities and di⁄erences of the recession patterns in Hong
Kong, Korea, Singapore and Thailand from both the production and demand sides using
data over the 1990-2003 period. The key similarities are that in all countries output suddenly
dropped in 1998 and consumption dropped as much as output did. The main di⁄erences are
the magnitudes of the economic downturns and their durations in each country.
2.1 Production Side
Figure 1 shows the ￿ uctuation of GDP and production factors per member of adult popula-
tion in each country from 1990 to 2002. Each series are linearly detrended. GDP and adult
3population data are from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database.
I computed the capital stock series using the perpetual inventory method and data from
Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993)2. Labor (total hours worked) is calculated from the number
of employed workers and average weekly hours worked per workers. Labor data is from the
International Labor Organization LABORSTA database.
GDP per adult fell 6.7%, 8.3%, 4.1% and 12.6% respectively. The ￿ uctuation in capital
lags the business cycle, which is typical since in general it takes time to replace or install
capital stock. On the other hand, labor reacts instantaneously to exogenous shocks. Thus,
in general, the ￿ uctuation in labor is important in explaining the business cycle. This is true
in Korea during the crisis where the labor series spikes down in 1998. However, labor does
not drop much compared to output in the other countries, which implies an extraordinarily
large drop in TFP in these countries3.
All four countries experienced GDP collapses in 1998 whereas the magnitudes of economic
downturns are quite di⁄erent ranging from 4.1% to 12.6%. Also, the recovery patterns are
quite di⁄erent. In Hong Kong, output remained over 5% below trend until 1999 and then
rapidly recovered to trend level. In Korea, output immediately recovered from the drop in
1998 and returned to trend level in 2000. In Singapore, output recovered immediately and
experienced a boom in 2000 but fell below trend level again in 2001. In Thailand, it took
until 2002 to return to its trend level.
2First, I compute the average depreciation rate from the Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) data for total
capital stock and ￿xed investment over the 1960-1990 period. Next, with the computed depreciation rate,
investment data from WDI and capital stock in 1960 adjusted for prices, I extrapolate the capital stock
series until 2003.
3This fact is explained in Meza and Quintin (2007). They claim that in Thailand and Indonesia the large
￿ uctuation in TFP would predict too much ￿ uctuation in output compared to data and that factor hoarding
is important in explaining this gap.
42.2 Demand Side
Figure 2 shows the ￿ uctuation of GDP and its components. The data are from WDI.
Consumption includes private and government consumption4. Investment includes private
and government ￿xed investment. For simplicity, inventory investment is included in the
trade balance. The trade balance is divided by GDP in order to stationarize the series. The
unit of each series is log deviations from the trend except for the trade balance to GDP ratio.
Both consumption and investment are procyclical whereas the trade balance is coun-
tercyclical during the crisis in all countries. The interesting fact is that in all countries
consumption fell as much as output. The annual consumption drops in Hong Kong, Ko-
rea and Singapore from 1997 to 1998 were 7.2%, 12.0%, and 5.1%, which are greater than
the output drops in each country. Thailand, which experienced the largest GDP drop, also
experienced a large drop in consumption by 11.4%.
3 Business Cycle Accounting Model
The economy is a small open economy in which the representative household can borrow
from abroad by issuing a 1-period international discount bond to foreigners at a given rate
of return. The household owns labor and physical capital stock, and owes debt to foreigners.
Given labor and capital income net of debt payment, the household chooses how much to
work, invest, consume, and borrow. The ￿rm produces a ￿nal good from capital and labor
using a Cobb-Douglas production function which ￿ uctuates according to changes in TFP. The
government collects distortionary taxes on labor income and investment from the household,
and fully rebates the revenue using lump-sum transfer. There are also distortions in the
4Ideally we would like to focus on household non-durable consumption. However, since this data is not
available for most countries, I use total ￿nal consumption expenditure instead.
5foreign debt market which is exogenously determined by foreign creditors. Following the
business cycle accounting method in CKM (2007), the distortions are treated as exogenous.
3.1 Household







where ￿(0 < ￿ < 1) is the subjective discount rate, ct is consumption, and lt is labor
supply which is the fraction of total hours available allocated to work5. For the periodical
preference function, u(￿), I assume GHH preferences which are commonly used in the small
open economy real business cycle literature such as Mendoza (1991) and Correia, Neves and
Rebelo (1995). GHH preferences are named after from Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu⁄man
(GHH (1988)) which introduced this preference function to the general equilibrium model.
The functional form is
u(ct;lt) = log(ct ￿ ￿l
￿
t) (2)
where parameters ￿(> 0) and ￿(> 1) represent the level and curvature of the utility cost of
labor respectively. The main feature of this preference function is that there are no income
e⁄ects on labor supply6.







where ht is the average weekly hours worked per worker, et is the number of employed workers and Nt is
adult population. lt is restricted to be between zero and one given that the average weekly hours worked
never exceeds 14 ￿ 7 hours.
6One well known fact in the small open economy real business cycle literature is that with Cobb-Douglas
preferences over consumption and leisure, the model will predict too much consumption smoothing. Correia,









= ct + ￿
x
txt + dt + ￿(dt+1) (3)
and the capital law of motion:
￿kt+1 = xt + (1 ￿ ￿)kt (4)
where kt is capital stock, xt is investment, dt is foreign debt, wt are real wages and rt are
real capital rental rates respectively. The lower-case letters ct;kt;xt; and dt are all detrended
per adult variables. I explain the detrending procedure in the appendix. For simplicity, I
assume that the population growth rate is constant and de￿ne ￿ = (1+￿)(1+n) where ￿ is




t represent wedges in foreign debt, labor and investment markets.
I assume the functional form of the debt adjustment cost function, ￿(dt+1), as
￿(dt+1￿d)2
2
where d is the steady state foreign debt. The debt adjustment cost is one of several ways to
remove the random walk component in the Euler equation for international asset holdings
that are introduced by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003). They also introduce models with
an endogenous discount factor, debt elastic interest rates and complete asset markets, and
conclude that all models deliver virtually identical quantitative results. I set ￿ arbitrarily
small so that this portfolio adjustment cost will not a⁄ect the short run dynamics of the
model.
Neves and Rebelo (1995) show that GHH preferences solve this issue because of the lack of income e⁄ects
on labor.
73.2 Firm






where yt is the detrended per adult output, and zt is TFP. The ￿rm￿ s pro￿t maximization
problem is,
max￿t = yt ￿ wtlt ￿ rtkt: (6)
3.3 Government
The government collects distortionary taxes and fully rebates them to the household using










t ￿ 1)xt (7)
holds for all periods. For simplicity, I do not consider government expenditure shocks since
they do not a⁄ect the main results. Instead, I include government purchases into consump-
tion and government ￿xed investment into total investment.
3.4 Foreign Sector
One key di⁄erence from CKM (2007) is that I explicitly introduce the foreign sector. Since
international debt is issued to the foreign sector, the small open economy must repay what-
8ever it borrowed from abroad. The trade balance is de￿ned by








That is, I assume that all costs including foreign debt wedges and adjustment costs are paid
to the foreign sector7.
3.5 Competitive Equilibrium















t=1 and d1, k1:
2. Firm optimizes given fwt;rt;ztg
1
t=1 :
3. Markets clear and the government budget constraint (7) holds.
4. The resource constraint holds:
yt = ct + xt + tbt: (9)
5. Shocks follow the process







￿0 and "t = ("dt;"lt;"xt;"zt)
0.
7It is not important whether the foreign sector receives these or not. What matters is that these resources
exit the small open economy.
93.6 Wedges
The business cycle accounting method interprets wedges as distortions in each relevant mar-
ket. In this section I de￿ne the wedges and discuss potential sources of them. Nonetheless,
the main focus of this paper is to assess the quantitative impact of these wedges and not to
reveal the identity of them.
3.6.1 Foreign Debt Wedges
Foreign debt wedges ￿d appear in the foreign debt Euler equation. They are de￿ned as the









￿ ￿(dt+1 ￿ d)
￿
= ￿Et [Uct+1]: (11)
CKM (2006, 2007) claim that shocks to the trade balance are equivalent to government
expenditure shocks. In CKM (2006) the trade balance is exogenously given and the sudden
improvements during the ￿nancial crises represent sudden stops of capital in￿ ows. In this
paper, I consider the trade balance as an endogenous variable following the small open
economy literature. I assume exogenous distortions in the foreign debt market as shocks to
the e⁄ective real interest rates9.
Foreign debt wedges capture shocks to the country speci￿c real interest rate premium.
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2005) claim that the ￿ uctuation in real
interest rates is a powerful source of business cycles in developing countries. In their setting,
the real interest rate premium is determined by foreign investors either independent from
8Since ￿ is set very small, the foreign debt adjustment cost is negligible.
9A same kind of wedge can be de￿ned in a closed economy as domestic bond wedges. In this case the
domestic real interest rate is endogenous and the net supply of bonds should be zero in all periods.
10domestic situations or as a reaction to changes in domestic policy and circumstances.
Foreign debt wedges also capture domestic monetary and foreign exchange policy shocks.
That is, real interest rates the domestic household faces may not be equal to real interest
rates on foreign debt. If the household does not have access to the bonds directly but can
borrow only from some intermediary, the monetary authority can a⁄ect the intertemporal
terms of trade through monetary policy. Nonetheless, for simplicity, I assume that foreign
debt wedges are fully paid to foreigners so that wedges directly a⁄ect the trade balance as
in (8).
3.6.2 Labor Wedges
In equilibrium, labor wedges ￿l appear as the di⁄erence between the consumption-leisure










CKM (2007) shows that a monetary model with sticky wages ￿ la Cole and Ohanian
(2002) can be mapped into a prototype real business cycle model with labor wedges. Cole
and Ohanian (2002) assumes that nominal wages are set in the beginning of the period by
labor unions and do not react to monetary shocks which occur subsequently. This creates
distortion in the labor market.
Cooley and Hansen (1989) generates labor wedges with a cash-in-advance constraint on
consumption goods in a monetary model. This model subdivides a period into two. In
the ￿rst sub-period the goods market opens and in the second sub-period the asset market
opens. The household needs cash in order to consume goods in the goods market whereas it
11uses income to accumulate money and ￿nancial assets for the next period. In￿ ation creates
distortions in the consumption-leisure choice by de￿ ating the relative value of labor income.
In Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), labor wedges emerge from a working capital as-
sumption on labor supply. Since ￿rms must borrow credit in the ￿nancial market in order to
pay wages, labor cost includes the borrowing cost in addition to wage payment. Therefore,
exogenous shocks to borrowing rates create distortions in the labor market. Neumeyer and
Perri (2005) applies this framework to a small open economy setting.
In Rotemberg and Woodford (1995), the markup of monopolistically competitive ￿rms
shows up as labor wedges. The key feature of New Keynesian models is that central bank can
neutralize the e⁄ects of short-run markup shocks with monetary policy under the assumption
of sticky prices.
3.6.3 Investment Wedges















It is straight forward to compute investment wedges in a deterministic model since all
of the arguments in the deterministic Euler equation are observable. However, investment
wedges will erroneously include all expectational errors in this case. In a stochastic model,
the estimation of the expected variables and the computation of the wedges must be done
simultaneously, taking into account the fact that future variables are not correctly predicted.
This procedure is described in the following section.
In GHH (1988), investment wedges arise from shocks to investment e¢ ciency. In their
12setting, high investment e¢ ciency enables the household to accumulate more capital stock
for a given investment level. This can be interpreted as low investment wedges in the business
cycle accounting model.
CKM (2007) shows that models with ￿nancial frictions such as Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) can be mapped into a prototype business
cycle accounting model with investment wedges. They also show that the model with capital
wedges ￿ la Christiano and Davis (2006)10 produces similar simulation results as those of the
model with investment wedges.
In general, small open economy models include adjustment costs on capital stock in order
to limit the volatility of investment in the model, which will otherwise be overstated. The
adjustment costs show up as investment wedges. For instance, high investment adjustment
cost that prevents investment to fall during a crisis can be considered as a drop in current
investment wedge and a rise in the future investment wedge.
3.6.4 TFP
By de￿nition, TFP is a wedge in the production process since it is computed as the residual
from the production function (5). CKM (2007) shows that a multisector model with input-
￿nancing frictions can be mapped into a prototype model with TFP shocks. Under their
setting, intermediate-goods producers are facing ￿nancial borrowing constraints that create
di⁄erences in borrowing rates across producers who have di⁄erent productivity levels. Since
intermediate-goods are not perfect substitutes, shocks to these ￿rm speci￿c borrowing rates
cause shifts in the input mix of ￿nal-good production which appears as a shock to aggregate
TFP.
10Capital wedges are interpreted as tax on capital income that shows up in the Euler equation.
13Ohanian (2001) conjectures that the huge drop in TFP during the US Great Depression
was caused by the loss of organizational capital, i.e. ￿the knowledge and know-how ￿rms use
to organize production￿ . When there are failures of intermediate goods suppliers, managers
must shift time away from production to searching for new suppliers. Since the organizational
capital is not used for production, this will appear as a drop in TFP.
Mismeasurement of inputs will also appear as changes in TFP. In GHH (1988), endoge-
nous capital utilization causes ￿ uctuation in aggregate TFP. Burnside, Eichenbaum and
Rebelo (1993) introduces labor hoarding as mismeasurement in labor supply which leads to
an overstatement of TFP. Meza and Quintin (2007) shows that factor hoarding explains why
in several emerging market ￿nancial crisis episodes output did not fall as much as a canonical
real business cycle model predicts.
Obviously, there is no guarantee that a model with exogenous TFP would yield the
same quantitative results as these endogenous TFP models. In context of business cycle
accounting, this implies that endogenous TFP models might accompany wedges in other
equilibrium conditions. One of the strengths of the business cycle accounting method is that




In order to simulate the model, the parameter values must be pinned down. The structural
parameters were chosen by calibration and estimation to match the model to data over the
1960-2003 period. The parameter values are listed in tables 1 and 2.
14The capital income share parameter ￿ was set at 1/3 for all countries. Gollin (2002)
shows that after adjusting for self-employment income the mean capital share over 41 sample
countries is approximately 1/3. Thus, I use this as the common capital income share for the
Asian countries.
All other parameters were obtained from the 1960-2003 data. Means of the data are used
for the steady state values of n, l,
y
k, and tb
y . Steady state values of wedges were assumed to
be one11. The trend growth rate ￿ is estimated by a regression of the log of Solow residuals
lnSRt = lnYt ￿ ￿lnKt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)lnLt
on a linear trend and a constant where Yt, Kt, and Lt are non-detrended per capita output,
capital and labor respectively. The depreciation rate ￿ is the average of ￿t calculated from
the capital accumulation equation
Nt+1Kt+1 = NtXt + (1 ￿ ￿t)NtKt;
where Nt is the adult population and Xt is nondetrended per capita investment. The discount




+ 1 ￿ ￿):
the labor disutility curvature parameter ￿ was computed by equating the elasticity of labor





to the Frisch labor supply elasticity computed from
the model with Cobb-Douglas preferences following Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1995). The
11The results are not sensitive to variations of these steady state values.
15labor disutility level parameter ￿ was calibrated from the steady state labor ￿rst order
condition:
(1 ￿ ￿)y = ￿￿l
￿:
Since investment and foreign debt wedges are de￿ned by expectational Euler equations
which include unobservable state variables, the parameters in the shock process (10) are
estimated with maximum likelihood estimation following CKM (2007)12. The parameters to
be estimated are the 16 persistence parameters in the 4 ￿ 4 matrix P and the 4 standard
deviations and 6 pairwise correlation coe¢ cients of the errors in the variance-covariance
matrix Q. I do not estimate the values of P0 since they are determined by steady state
equations. I use linearly detrended data on output, consumption, investment and labor for
the estimation since there are 4 shocks to be estimated.
4.2 Simulation Method
Given that all parameters are speci￿ed, the model can be solved quantitatively. I use a linear
solution method ￿ la Uhlig (1999) to solve for the linear decision rules. Having obtained the
decision rules, I compute the unobserved exogenous variables ￿x
t and ￿d
t. Since fyt;ct;lt;xtg



















where DR is a matrix containing the corresponding linear decision rule coe¢ cients. In
speci￿c,
12The Dynare package for Matlab o⁄ers user-friendly programs for not only MLE but also Bayesian
estimation. I follow CKM (2007) and use MLE.
161. I assume k1990 = d1990 = 0:
































Next, in order to evaluate the e⁄ects of the wedges separately, I plug each type of wedges
into the model one by one and compute the ￿ uctuation of endogenous variables using the
linear decision rules. The method is identical to CKM (2007) except that I use foreign debt
wedges rather than government wedges. When plugging each type of wedges into the model,
I do not change the estimated stochastic process. That is, the o⁄-diagonal terms in the
persistence matrix are kept non-zero. Obviously, plugging in all of the wedges will produce
a simulated series that perfectly matches the data.
4.3 Quantitative Results
4.3.1 Wedge Analysis
Figure 3 presents the values of wedges in each country over the 1990-2003 period. Since
matrix P relates current shocks to future expected shocks, the e⁄ects of these shocks are
complex. That is, a shock today will a⁄ect the expectation of future shocks and the reactions
of agents depend on these expectations. In the following, I limit my discussion to the direct
e⁄ects of each shock in order to build some intuition.
An interesting fact is that foreign debt wedges jumped up in Korea and Thailand in
1998 while the ￿ uctuations of them in Hong Kong and Singapore were decimal. The fact
17that these wedges in Korea and Thailand are large implies that the disturbances in the
foreign debt market during the crisis were high in these countries. An increase in foreign
debt wedges reduces borrowing, which improves the trade balance. At the same time, this
a⁄ects the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution in (11), which tends to reduce current
consumption13. This also reduces investment since the expected return on capital must be
equated to the return on foreign debt according to (11) and (13).
Labor wedges fell sharply in all countries except for Korea in which they fell only mildly.
Labor wedges primarily a⁄ect labor supply and consumption by changing the e⁄ective real
wage as in (12). A decline in labor wedges will cause consumption to increase through both
income and intratemporal substitution e⁄ects. Since there are no income e⁄ects on labor
with GHH preferences, labor will increase through the substitution e⁄ect. Thus, the drops
in labor wedges during the crises have expansionary e⁄ects in each country.
Investment wedges fell sharply in all countries. A drop in investment wedges stimulates
investment since they represent the prices of investment relative to consumption. This tends
to decrease current consumption through substitution e⁄ects but has little e⁄ect on current
labor supply or output due to the lack of income e⁄ects on labor. Instead, it a⁄ects future
output and labor through increasing future capital stock.
TFP fell sharply in all countries. A drop in TFP leads to a drop in output while it also
lowers the marginal product of labor. This leads to a drop in real wage which reduces labor
supply through the substitution e⁄ect. Consumption also tends to fall from income and
substitution e⁄ects.
13The intertemporal substitution e⁄ect of a rise in foreign debt wedge on current consumption is negative
while the sign of the income e⁄ect depends on whether the country is a net borrower or lender. If the country
is a borrower, the income e⁄ect is also negative.
184.3.2 Individual Simulation Results
Figure 4 presents the results of individual simulations with each type of wedges14. In Hong
Kong, TFP and investment wedges have contractionary e⁄ects whereas labor and foreign debt
wedges have slightly expansionary e⁄ects during the crisis. As discussed above, investment
wedges do not have strong e⁄ects on current labor or output. The increase in investment
wedges in 1997 reduces capital stock in 1998 which has contractionary e⁄ects on labor and
output. Investment wedges are also important in explaining the drop in consumption during
the crisis. An important result is that TFP alone predicts output to fall too much. This
is consistent with the ￿nding of Meza and Quintin (2007) that labor hoarding is important
in explaining why labor and output did not fall as much as the theory would predict. In
context of business cycle accounting, labor hoarding overstates the drop in TFP and will
appear as a reduction in labor wedge.
In Korea, TFP and foreign debt wedges have contractionary e⁄ects whereas labor and
investment wedges have slightly expansionary e⁄ects during the crisis. Almost all of the
drop in output can be explained by the drop in TFP. The increase in foreign debt wedges
helps explaining the drop in consumption. However, TFP and foreign debt wedges predict
an excessive fall in investment during the crisis. Thus, without the expansionary e⁄ects from
investment wedges in 1999, output, consumption and labor will all hit a trough in 199915.
In Singapore, TFP have contractionary e⁄ects while the other wedges have slightly ex-
pansionary e⁄ects during the crisis. Investment wedges are important in explaining the drop
in consumption during the crisis. In addition, TFP alone will predict too much drop in GDP
as in Hong Kong.
14Results of simulations with a combination of shocks are available upon request.
15In Otsu (2006), investment adjustment costs prevent investment to fall too much during the crisis so
that TFP alone can predict the sudden drop and rapid recovery of output in Korea.
19In Thailand, TFP and foreign debt wedges have contractionary e⁄ects during the crisis.
Again, TFP alone predicts an excessive drop in output as in Hong Kong and Singapore. In
fact, labor supply did not fall at all during the crisis. This is an extreme case that strongly
supports the labor hoarding explanation of Meza and Quintin (2007).
Overall, the similarity across the Asian crisis is that the drop in TFP is important in
explaining the economic downturn. In fact, in all countries except for Korea, TFP predicts
too much drop in output. One key di⁄erence is that in order to explain the consumption drop
during the crisis, foreign debt wedge is important in Korea and Thailand while investment
wedge is important in Hong Kong and Singapore. I conjecture that this is because Korea
and Thailand were net debtors whereas Hong Kong and Singapore were net creditors when
the crisis occurred.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I conduct a stochastic business cycle accounting simulation using the wedges
computed from equilibrium conditions as exogenous shocks and investigate how they a⁄ected
the East Asian economies over the 1990-2003 period. The standard neoclassical small open
economy model was calibrated to data for Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Thailand over
the 1960-2003 period.
I ￿nd that TFP is important in explaining the economic downturns in all countries. I
also ￿nd that distortions in the foreign debt market are important in Korea and Thailand
whereas investment wedges are important in Hong Kong and Singapore in explaining the
large consumption drops. Future study should focus on revealing the relationship between
TFP and foreign debt wedges in indebted countries and the relationship between TFP and
20investment wedges in net creditor economies.
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23A Detrending
Business cycle accounting model is detrended with the growth trend. Consider a non-





where zt is detrended TFP and Xt is the labor-augmenting technical progress. I assume that
the growth rate of Xt is constant:
Xt = (1 + ￿)Xt￿1:
According to neoclassical growth theory, per adult variables Yt, Kt, and Xtlt should be












Xt ￿ yt and Kt
Xt ￿ kt.
A notable assumption is made for the preference function. The detrended preference
function (2) is derived from a non-detrended preference function
u(Ct;lt) = log(Ct ￿ ￿Xtl
￿
t): (15)
The growth of labor disutility can be justi￿ed as follows. Greenwood, Rogerson and Wright
(1995) shows that GHH preferences are equivalent to a reduced form of a preference function
with consumption, leisure, and home production. If we assume that home production uses
24the same technology as market-goods production, disutility from the loss of home-goods
should have the same growth trend as market-goods.
B Cobb-Douglas Preference
In this paper, I assume GHH preferences because it is the standard assumption in the
small open economy literature. In this section, I will introduce an alternative preference
speci￿cation, Cobb-Douglas preferences, that were used in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
(2007). The functional form is
u(ct;lt) = ￿logct + (1 ￿ ￿)log(1 ￿ lt):
This preference function is widely used in closed economy macroeconomic literature. The
key di⁄erence between the Cobb-Douglas and GHH preferences is that the Cobb-Douglas
preferences have income e⁄ects on labor. The procedure is the same as the GHH preference
case. In order to save space, I will only present the simulation results for Korea in this
section16.
Figure A1 shows the computed wedges for all countries. Compared to the GHH preference
case, the main di⁄erences is that labor wedges jump up during the crisis in the Cobb-Douglas
case (except for in Thailand). As a result, labor wedges have a strong contractionary e⁄ect
on the economy in contrary to the GHH preference case. Figure A2 shows the simulation
results for Korea. The contractionary e⁄ect of labor wedges on output is stronger than TFP
during the crisis. Also, foreign debt wedges have expansionary e⁄ects during the crisis. This
is closely related to the results of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2006) that sudden stops
16Figures for other countries are available upon request.
25of capital in￿ ows cause income e⁄ects which tends to increase labor. Similarly, an increase
in foreign debt wedge causes income e⁄ects on labor that were absent in the GHH case.
Nonetheless, it is still true that foreign debt wedges in Korea and Thailand have depressing
e⁄ects on consumption.
Clearly, the results depend on the assumption on preferences. The business cycle ac-
counting method is silent in terms of the plausibility of the preference function assumption.
I use GHH preferences as a benchmark because it is the standard assumption in the small
open economy literature.
C Tables and Figures
Table 1. Steady State Parameter Values
Hong Kong Korea Singapore Thailand
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